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In a paper written in 2002 with Preetum Domah, we provided strong evidence that 
there were significant human resource constraints which limited the scale and, 
hence, the scope and potential effectiveness of electricity/energy regulatory 
agencies in developing countries.  That paper (DPS), although only circulated in 
working paper versions, has been quite widely referred to in policy discussions and 
also quite widely cited .   
 
The key findings of the paper were: 
 
(i) There were large fixed costs in electricity regulation which were particularly 
important for developing countries; 
 
(ii) These fixed costs were particularly serious as regards professional staff; and  
 
(iii) The form and explanatory variables of the estimated human resource cost 
function for developing countries was quite different from that found for developed 
countries. 
 
The discussion in this new paper reveals that the fixed costs of regulation remain as 
significant as our original DPS paper suggested.   
 
In addition, the human resource requirements for specialist 
professional staff seem still to be a binding constraint for some low 
income and/or small countries.   
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However, the most significant - and worrying - finding of this current paper is how 
little new information on regulatory staff numbers there is since 2002.  It is surprising 
(and disappointing) that no multilateral or regional regulatory grouping collects such 
data. 
 
What little new data has emerged (e.g. for India and Latin America) tends to confirm 
the findings for 2001-02.  Little seems to have changed:  the Indian State Regulators 
still have tiny numbers of staff, the Caribbean and some of the smaller, poorer Latin 
American countries still have very low numbers of regulatory staff, while the middle 
income Latin American regulators seem, at least as far as these data inform us, not 
to have any human resource problems.  For Africa, for the countries covered typical 
electricity staff numbers are in the 30-60 range.  Of the three regulators in both the 
DPS sample for whom we have been able to collect recent data, two have grown by 
over 50% since 2002.  
 
We strongly believe that more attention should be paid to human resource issue and 
how it can best be addressed.  We urgently need panel data and this requires 
systematically collecting data on regulatory staff numbers on a regular (e.g. annual) 
basis.  We see this as an obvious – and important task for regional regulatory 
groupings (such AFUR, OLADE and IERN). 
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Abstract 
 
We provide strong evidence that there are significant human resource constraints which limit the 
scale and, hence, the scope and potential effectiveness of electricity/energy regulatory agencies in 
developing countries. We summarise the key findings in our earlier Domah, Pollitt and Stern 
paper (2002). We then consider what new evidence there is on regulatory staffing levels since 
2001/2002 and on the implications of high fixed costs for developing countries’ electricity and 
regulatory policies.  Our conclusion is that little has changed over the intervening period. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In a paper written in 2002 with Preetum Domah, we provided strong evidence that there were 
significant human resource constraints which limited the scale and, hence, the scope and potential 
effectiveness of electricity/energy regulatory agencies in developing countries.  That paper, 
although only circulated in working paper versions, has been quite widely referred to in policy 
discussions and also quite widely cited2
There were caveats about these findings, which were drawn from postal and e-mail survey 
responses from regulators in 60 countries during 2001 and 2002.  In particular, it was unclear 
whether countries’ responses to staff numbers were always consistent.  In spite of all of the 
checks that we could do, we had limited very quality control over the responses and little external 
information against which to check them.  In a few cases, based on what else we knew about the 
countries, the numbers of regulatory staff looked just far too high to be credible
.   
 
The key findings of the paper were: 
 
(i) There were large fixed costs in electricity regulation which were particularly 
important for developing countries; 
 
(ii) These fixed costs were particularly serious as regards professional staff; and  
 
(iii) The form and explanatory variables of the estimated human resource cost function 
for developing countries was quite different from that found for developed 
countries. 
 
3
In the 2002 working paper, we took a simple income definition to distinguish between developed 
and developing countries (whether countries in 2001 had GDP per head above or below $4,300 in 
.  In addition, we 
suspected that many of the staff classified as ‘professional’ in developing countries would not 
have been so classified in developed countries (e.g. book-keeping staff).  In that case, our data 
might have over-estimated the numbers of professional staff in for developing countries.   
 
In general, it is likely that the survey provided a relatively optimistic view of regulatory 
developments and staff numbers.  This is likely because the overall response rate was 34% and 
that, given the nature of the survey, country regulators/Ministries would have been more likely to 
respond if they had in place regulatory arrangements (including staff numbers) of which they 
were proud and more likely to be non-respondents if they felt that their regulatory arrangements 
were deficient.  Hence, our sample may provide an upward bias to the quality of regulatory 
arrangements and staff numbers in the total population of countries and, in particular, in 
developing countries.  Unfortunately, the data does not exist which would allow us to test for the 
existence of and potential magnitude of this probable bias.  
 
                                                 
2   “Modelling the Costs of Electricity Regulation:  Evidence of Human Resource Constraints in Developing 
Countries”, Cambridge CMI Working Paper No 11 and London Business School Regulation Initiative 
Working Paper No 49. 
3  For instance, Poland recorded 285 electricity/energy regulatory staff, of whom 232 were deemed as 
‘professional’.  Given our knowledge of Polish energy regulation that only made sense if it included local 
authority staff involved in regulation of district heating. 
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constant 2000 $ US).  That led to the inclusion in the list of developed countries of, among 
others, Argentina, Brazil, the Czech Republic and Trinidad & Tobago. However, from an 
institutional development perspective, it was not at all clear that this was ideal and we discussed 
taking an alternative country assignment between developed and developing countries. 
 
In recent years, there has been continued discussion of the importance of the role of regulation in 
electricity supply and investment growth in developing countries4
• contracting out much of the detail of regulation to consultants or co-operative expert 
exchanges with other regulators  
.  The role of human resource 
constraints has also been much discussed so that, there have been a variety of proposals for back-
up solutions, particularly for low income and/or small developing countries 
.   
A non-exclusive list of these includes:  
 
• greatly increased use of contracts relative to regulatory processes, sometimes with binding 
arbitration either in-country or externally 
• non-discretionary regulation 
• much greater reliance on expatriate regulatory experts or expert panels5
 
. 
It seems clear that effective regulation is, in practice, important for electricity supply industry 
performance in developing and transition at all levels: generation, transmission and distribution.  
Both case studies and econometric research have shown significant impacts on investment, labour 
productivity, cost recovery and distribution losses6
2. Domah, Pollitt and Stern (DPS) Revisited 
.  However, there is also no question that many 
developing countries still struggle to provide effective electricity/energy regulation.  There are 
many reasons why that is so, including political and legal reasons.  However, human resource 
constraints – particularly the relative scarcity of sufficient experienced professional people in 
many developing countries – clearly still play a major role. 
 
In what follows, in Section 2, we summarise and visualise the key findings in the earlier Domah, 
Pollitt and Stern paper in the light of our current understanding.  In section 3, we consider what 
new evidence there is on regulatory staffing levels since our 2001/2 and on the implications of 
high fixed costs for developing countries’ electricity and regulatory policies.  Section 4 provides 
some concluding comments. 
 
 
 
Although we found significant evidence of high fixed costs, it was – somewhat surprisingly - not
                                                 
4  See, for instance, Cubbin and Stern (2006), Pollitt (2008), Andres, Guasch & Azumendi (2008), Estache 
and Rossi (2008) and others for electricity regulatory impacts and many papers on the impact of regulation 
on telecoms performance. 
5  For discussion of these and other options, including their relative advantages and disadvantages, see 
Chapter 4 of Brown, Stern and Tenenbaum (2006) and the papers cited there. 
6  See, for instance, Mota (2004) who compares Brazilian with US electricity experience. 
 
the case that in 2001 developed countries had smaller numbers of regulatory staff.  The median 
number of staff (51) was identical between developed and developing countries, although there 
was more difference in the mean number of total staff per regulatory agency - 131 in developed 
countries as against 72 in the developing countries.  This, however was primarily due to the 
 4 
inclusion in the sample of a few very large US PUCs (Public Utility Commissions) - e.g. 
California with 946 staff – though these covered up to 6 regulated sectors. 
 
For professional staff, taking the data at face value, developing countries actually had a higher 
median number – 37 as against 32, although the mean was markedly higher for developed 
countries, 81 as opposed to 48.  Whether, though, these numbers classify like-with-like is a 
difficult issue.  It is hard to believe that the 95 staff classified as ‘professional’ for Cambodia are 
comparable in educational and other skills to the 90 recorded for Spain.  Nevertheless, the 
resource burden for even moderately skilled white-collar staff requiring secondary education can 
still be difficult for low income countries and may well impose significant opportunity costs. 
 
It was not the case that developing countries had lower absolute numbers of staff or of 
professional staff - in 2001.  A major reason for that was that there were some very small 
developed country electricity/energy regulators in the sample e.g. Netherlands 25 with  staff in 
total.  However, by 2005, their staff numbers had grown to 70.  Nevertheless, absolute staff 
numbers was not the main issue. The key point was that developing countries have a very much 
lower level of electrification.  Hence, the number of regulatory staff per number of connections 
(or customers) is much
In Africa, several countries have electrification rates of 10% or lower (e.g. Malawi and Uganda) 
and others both in Africa and among the poorer Asian economies have electrification rates of 10-
20% (e.g. Cambodia and Zambia)
 higher in developing countries due to the much lower number of 
connections per million population than in developing countries.   
 
7
                                                 
7  See Human Development Report 2007-08.  
.  For such countries, any regulatory agency - however low-
geared to the actual number of customers and companies - will inevitably look highly staffed 
relative to its developed country counterpart.  It is this that gives rise to the observed fixed costs 
and leads policy-makers to explore alternatives (such as contracting out regulation or regulatory 
swaps) that either reduce the regulatory burden; or at the limit, schemes like expert panels or 
regulation by contract alone that may offer the possibility of eliminating the need for a separate 
autonomous regulatory agency.   
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TEXT BOX 
 
REGULATORY FIXED COSTS AND TELECOM REGULATION 
 
Regulatory staff numbers for telecom regulators are also difficult to find – they are not recorded 
on the ITU website.  However, Buckle (1999) reported some data for the late 1990s. 
 
Buckle’s data just recorded total staff numbers.  However, his findings showed quite large 
regulators – Jordan with 65 staff, Malaysia with 85 staff, Peru with 125 and Chile with 130.  The 
only small(ish) developing country telecom regulators in his 13 country sample were Colombia  
with 20 staff plus 20 consultants (in 1996) and Jamaica with 27 staff.  Chile and Peru had 
responsibility for spectrum management and regulation as well as telecom regulation – but so did 
Jamaica and Colombia. 
 
However, the fixed costs of telecom regulation are rather lower than for electricity regulation  (or 
water regulation) since mobile coverage and penetration rates are so much higher in even low 
income developing countries than are electricity coverage and connection rates.  In 2007, it is 
reported in a recent Frontier Economics report that, in Sub-Saharan Africa, mobile coverage was 
around 60% and penetration rates were 37%, which means that usage rates will be around 50%.  
By March 2008, India’s tele-density was 26%, with 86% of the connections from mobile. 
 
Given the explosion in developing country mobile penetration rates since 2000, the much lower 
fixed costs of telecom regulation may not have been so different from electricity 10-15 years ago 
but their importance is certainly much lower now.  Note also that, even if mobile regulation may 
not require much in the way of detailed work, telecom regulators will have responsibility for 
fixed networks and regulatory implications of IT and broadband as well as (in many cases) radio 
spectrum and/or broadcasting issues (viz Botswana and Jamaica). 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Even normalising by population, developed and developing countries electricity regulators on 
average had very similar median (and mean) numbers both of total staff and professional staff.  
But, we estimated an average cost curve of regulation by plotting the number of staff per million 
customers per regulated sector8 against number of customers. The average cost curve of 
regulation thus involves taking the total number of reported staff for the regulatory agency as a 
whole and dividing it by the multiple of the number of customers (in millions) and the number of 
regulated sectors9
 
.   As shown in Figures 1 and 2 below, the slope of the resulting line is 
downwards for both total and professional staff.  This indicates significant economies of scale 
and a high fixed cost element of regulation. 
 
 
                                                 
8  To cover multi-sector regulators. Note that in each of the Figures that follow we drop Cambodia and India  
(CERC) as extreme outliers. We have also corrected some mistakes in the original dataset, notably on  
some of the population and customer number figures. 
9  For example the Jamaica regulatory agency has 28 total staff, 0.427m customers and 3 regulated sectors.  
This gives a Y axis value for Figure 1 (Total staff) of 28/(0.427*3)=19.6. 
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Figure 1: Average Regulatory Staff Cost (based on Total Staff) 
 
 
 7 
Figure 2: Average Regulatory Staff Cost (based on Professional Staff) 
 
 
 
 
The key point to note is that the developing countries were concentrated on the relatively steeper 
(left side) of the curve – and that many more of the developing country electricity/energy 
regulators had staff numbers above the fitted (power function) line to the whole sample10
Even more telling in terms of the human resource burden on human resource poor developing 
countries was when we plotted the ratio of staff numbers per sector divided by the number of 
people in the country (in millions) who had completed post-secondary education (on the Y-axis) 
against customer numbers (on the X-axis). Thus the Y axis takes the number of staff in the whole 
regulatory agency divided by the number of sectors regulated and divides this number by the 
number (in millions) of people who had completed post-secondary education.
.  
Conversely, the developed countries’ regulatory staff numbers were spread out along the whole 
length of the curve and more were below than above the fitted line. 
 
11
                                                 
10  Note that the developed country observed on the top left of Figure 1 is Barbados. 
11  For example the Jamaica regulatory agency has 28 total staff and 3 regulated sectors, while the 7.8% of the  
Jamaican population of 2.598m has completed post-secondary education. This gives a Y axis value for  
Figure 3 (Total staff) of (28/3)/(2.598*0.078)=46.1. Strictly the percentage completing post-secondary  
Education (7.8% for Jamaica)  is relative to the relevant starting cohort but our calculation is a reasonable 
estimate of the relative human resource burden across countries from readily accessible data. 
  Again, we 
plotted this relationship both for total staff and for professional staff to provide a measure of the 
size of the regulatory agency relative to the pool of qualified staff.   
 
The results of this exercise are plotted in Figures 3 and 4.  They again show: 
 
 (i) a downward sloping curve – implying high fixed resource burden cost; 
 8 
 
(ii) developing countries concentrated on the left hand side of the figure and with 
many above the fitted line;  and 
 
(iii) developed countries spread along the curve with more below or very close to 
rather than clearly above the fitted line. 
 
Figure 3: Average Human Resource Burden (based on Total Staff) 
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Figure 4: Average Human Resource Burden (based on Professional Staff) 
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As (anecdotal) supporting evidence, one of us was working in an advisory team to a small, well-
governed African country about 10 years ago.  Our task was to recommend to its telecom 
regulatory agency as to how best it could carry out the functions that it had been assigned in the 
regulatory law under which it operated.  We were given a free hand – except that we were told at 
the outset of the assignment that any recommendation to hire 25 or so accountants (or similar 
professionals) would be impossible even to consider seriously since there was no way that this 
agency would be allowed to hire half the accountants in the country.  Of course, there would have 
been an immense opportunity cost of assigning significant numbers of scarce professionals to this 
agency rather than to the country’s companies, Ministries and other agencies and any such 
recommendation would have been virtually impossible to justify.  Hence, the question became 
how to prioritise regulatory requirements and how best to use the fall-back options discussed in 
the previous section.  This exercise brought out the fixed costs of regulation very starkly and in 
clear practical terms.  
 
The other main empirical results reported in DPS were of regressions for the numbers of total and 
of professional staff12.  The two most important points arising from this were: 
 
(i) The best fitting equation for developed countries was quite different from that for 
developing countries; and 
 
(ii) Age of regulatory agency dummies showed significant effects on staff numbers, 
total and professional, for developing countries, but not
 Staff numbers in developed countries were much more strongly related to customer 
numbers than in developing countries; 
 for developed countries.   
 
For developing country total staff, the dominant effect was of significantly more staff for energy 
regulators in existence for 10 years or more.  For professional staff, there were significantly more 
in post after 2 years and again after 5 and, even more, after 10 years. 
 
In terms of differences between developed and developing countries, the most obvious were: 
 
 Having more regulated companies in the sector was strongly associated with more staff in 
developed countries but no significant relationship was found for developing countries;  
 Neither equation showed any systematic relationship between real GDP per head and 
regulatory staff numbers;  
                                                 
12  The data used in our original regressions did not incorporate the latest adjustments made when compiling 
Figures 1-4 for this paper.  However, the original regression work done included extensive sensitivity 
testing e.g. estimating equations with and without the large US regulators and other outliers and the 
resulting estimates changed very little.  Hence, we are confident that the conclusions of the original 
quantitative results would not be altered by the (minor) data adjustments reflected in the Figures. We also 
conducted further sensitivity analysis (with the help of Alexandra Maratou) on the original dataset testing a 
nested full sample model classifying all middle income and transition countries as developing rather than 
developed countries (reflecting an institutional quality measure of development rather than our original 
income based measure). The results of this analysis also supported the conclusions of the work reported in 
the original paper.  
 11 
 For professional staff, licence fee funding was positively related to professional staff 
numbers in developed countries but it was negatively related in developing countries13
 In developing countries, but not developed countries, civil service pay scales for 
regulatory agencies were associated with lower numbers of professional staff.  (It is 
unclear whether this is a demand effect arising from shortage of funds or a supply side 
effect from relative earnings in public and private sectors.) 
; 
and 
 
We also used our equations to predict the number of staff required for median values of the 
variables.  These indicated that, using median values of the variables, a typical developing 
country regulatory agency in 2001-2 needed around 30-35 staff in total compared to a developed 
country, which needed an estimated 53 staff.   For professional staff, the numbers were around 
15-20 in developing countries and around 35 in developed countries.  This was in spite of the 
median developed country having three times the number of electricity customers and three rather 
than two sectors to regulate. Finally, predictions for Guatemala, Sri Lanka and Zambia (none of 
which were in the main sample) suggested that these relatively small countries would need total 
staff numbers of around 50-60 and 25-45 professional staff. 
These results clearly demonstrate the nature of the high fixed resource cost of electricity 
regulation for small and low income developing countries.  
 
3. More Recent Information on Regulatory Staff Numbers in Developing Countries 
 
The Domah survey data is now over 6 years old and there have been major developments in 
utility (and electricity/energy) sector reform and regulation.  So, given the concerns about human 
resource costs of regulation, what has happened to regulatory staff numbers in developing 
countries since 2001/2?  The answer is that, in general, we don’t know. 
 
There are some snippets of information that we report below, but it does not seem to be data that 
anyone regularly or systematically collects.   In particular, it does not seem to be reported on 
IERN (the International Energy Regulation Network), nor on regional websites like AFUR (the 
African regulators) nor OLADE (the Latin American energy website).   
 
IERN reproduces country Factsheets, which typically give total staff numbers (but not 
professional staff numbers) country-by-country.  However, these are not assembled into any 
single table.  More importantly, the majority of Latin American, Asian and African developing 
countries do not have IERN Factsheet data.  For Africa, only 3 out of 26 countries have an IERN 
Factsheet.  For some countries, staff numbers may be available from individual regulatory agency 
websites, but for most it is not recorded. 
 
Individual researchers may collect some relevant data for their research purposes by approaching 
individual regulators (as Preetum Domah did) but it does not seem to be systematically collected 
by any international agency.  This is true for telecoms as well as energy as there seems to be no 
such data on the ITU website.   
 
                                                 
13  Whether regulators were autonomous or not had no impact on staff numbers in either developed or 
developing countries. 
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In consequence, there are no data sets of staffing with comparable definitions and some of the 
data reported to the researchers is often of variable quality.  Also survey response rates can often 
be low – the response rate in the Domah survey was 34% after major prompting.  Most 
importantly, it seems impossible to collect time-series data on staffing for a significant number of 
developing countries. 
 
This last is important in that most of the regulators for whom we had staff numbers in 2001/2002, 
particularly in developing countries, were very young, e.g. 3-5 years old.  We know for EU 
countries that many have grown substantially.  If the same is true for developing countries, we 
may well have under-estimated the fixed costs of regulation for them.  Insofar as the data exist 
that allows us to test this, we will examine this below. 
 
We return in our concluding comments to the implications of these issues for policy as well as 
research but we continue below by summarizing two recent studies. 
 
3.1 India:  Staffing in State Electricity Regulators 
 
In 2003, the Prayas Group14
• On average, ERCs had approval for 8-10 professional and technical staff.  Only Andhra 
Pradesh approval for more than 20 while West Bengal and Maharashtra had approval for 
only 2 professional and technical posts.  Requests for additional professional and 
technical staff are delayed for months or years. 
 published a major, and, in general, very critical study of State 
Electricity regulatory commissions (ERCs).  Staffing was one of the areas where they were 
particularly critical. 
 
The key 2003 Prayas findings in this area were that ERCs had grossly inadequate staffing 
resources and that this contributed greatly to the disappointing performance of the agencies.  The 
most important findings were: 
 
• The average number of authorized administrative posts was around 20-30 but many of 
these posts were left unfilled for various reasons (State Government unwillingness to 
allow them to be filled, low pay, etc.)   
• 8 out of 12 reporting ERCs had no
• Many of the professional and technical staff were on loan from the incumbent utility
 permanent professional and technical staff.  Andhra 
Pradesh had 8 permanent professional and technical staff and Orissa had 12; none of the 
others had more than 3. 
15
The Prayas Report is particularly valuable in focusing on professional staff numbers.  This 
approach has been replicated as one part of a recent study by TERI which attempts to evaluate the 
performance of Indian State ERCs.  The results of this study for professional staff levels in 9 
Indian states in 2006 are reproduced below.  The dominant feature to note is how little progress 
has been made since the earlier survey. 
. 
                                                 
14  Prayas Energy Group (2003). 
15  See Stern and Cubbin (2005) and Prayas Energy Group (2003). 
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Table 1 - Professional Staff Levels in 9 Indian State Electricity Agencies 2006 
State Number of Professional Staff 
  
Andhra Pradesh 19 
Assam 6 * 
Delhi 16 
Jharkand 2 ** 
Kerala 4 
Madhya Pradesh 22 
Maharashtra 20 
Uttarakhand 9 
West Bengal 7 
* 2 of the 6 are consultants 
** Both are consultants 
Source:  Garg et al., 2007,  p. 53.    
  
Of these States, only Jharkand (8 million) and Delhi (14 million) have population sizes of under 
25 million.  Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra all had populations of over 50 
million people and, even with relatively low connection rates, they (plus West Bengal and 
Kerala) have over 5 million (officially registered) consumers16
3.2 Latin America and the Caribbean 
. 
 
It is hardly surprising, with such small numbers of professional staff, both in absolute and relative 
terms, that Indian electricity regulation has found it so difficult to make much progress.  These 
difficulties remain and lead TERI to conclude their report with a long list of major 
recommendations for improvement.   
 
In summary, at least as yet, Indian State Governments seem to be unable and/or unwilling to pay 
the necessary fixed costs of having a regulatory agency.  Nor, with the possible exception of 
Delhi, have they adopted any of the solutions that might reduce the need for an effective and 
reasonably well-staffed regulatory entity. 
 
 
 
A recent paper by Andres et al. (2007) provides the results of a survey of regulators in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. The survey was carried out by the relevant World Bank group to 
assess the quality of governance of Latin American electricity regulatory agencies.  The paper 
reports results for 21 national regulators, although survey responses were received from a larger 
number of countries.  The date of the survey is not clearly stated but seems to be around 2006-07.   
 
The survey collected a great deal of information on country regulators.  The survey document, 
reproduced as Appendix 2 of the paper, seems to derive primarily from the standard 
recommended postal survey set out as Annex C of Brown et al. (2006).  However, for the 
purposes of this paper, the main interest is in the reported staff numbers for 21 national regulators 
                                                 
16  See Garg et al. (2007), p.62. 
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in 19 countries set out in Appendix 1 of Andres et al (2007)17
The results for the staff numbers are summarized in Table 2 below. 
.  Unfortunately, the data gives 
numbers only of total staff so that it is not possible to identify professional staff numbers where 
the main human resource problems exist. 
 
 
Table 2 - Total Staff Numbers in 21 National Latin American and Caribbean Electricity 
Regulators 2006 
  
Staff Numbers Under 25 26-50 51-100 101-250 Over 250 
      
 3 Countries  3 Countries 3  Countries 10 Countries 2 Countries 
 Honduras, 
Trinidad & 
Tobago, 
Uruguay 
Barbados, 
Chile(a), 
Jamaica 
Bolivia, 
Colombia(a)  
and 
Guatemala 
Argentina, 
Chile (b), 
Costa Rica, 
Dominican 
Republic,  
Ecuador, El 
Salvador, 
Mexico, 
Nicaragua, 
Panama and 
Peru. 
Brazil and 
Colombia(b) 
 Source:  Andres et al. (2007) Appendix 1, p 41. 
 
The key conclusions from this table are that the problems of regulatory staff numbers seem only 
to be significant for some of the Caribbean Islands and for Honduras.  All of those are very small 
countries and, in addition, Honduras is one of the lowest in terms of income per head.   
 
For the non-island, middle income countries in this region, staff numbers do not appear to be a 
constraint.  Some of the regulators are very large, particularly as in many of these countries, 
electricity markets operate with few companies and constrained generation and supply 
competition.   ANEEL in Brazil with 765 staff is much the largest – approaching California PUC 
levels and twice as large as the UK - and this excludes non-Federal electricity regulators.  Some 
of these state regulators are sizable agencies.  For instance, the Domah 2001/2 survey reported 
Sao Paulo as having 60 staff, although this will include non-energy regulatory staff as in a US 
PUC.  Argentina also has significant numbers of regulatory staff beyond the “more than 100” in 
the national-level regulatory agency. 
 
Of course, the major potential resource constraint is of professional staff.  It is quite possible for 
regulators to be very large but find it hard to recruit or retain sufficient numbers of professional 
staff.  This certainly seems to be a problem for some of the smaller island regulators and may be 
for some others.   
                                                 
17 Chile and Colombia each have two regulatory agencies, a smaller one which has no autonomy from the 
Ministry and a larger one that does.  It is the latter - the (b) agencies in the table above - which seem to carry 
out the majority of the functions that would be the responsibility of an EU or North American independent 
electricity/energy regulatory agency.  Barbados, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Jamaica include telecom 
regulation and several include water and sewerage and any regulated transport industries. 
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Inspection of the DPS data suggests that the proportion of professional staff in total staff was 
around two-thirds in the Latin American and Caribbean countries in 2001/0218.  The DPS sample 
includes the majority of countries included in Table 3.  On this basis, professional staff numbers 
are unlikely to be a problem outside the Caribbean Islands and Honduras - provided that this 
covers sufficient numbers of critical high-level professionals19
3.3 Africa 
. 
 
 
Information on staff numbers for African electricity/energy regulators is difficult to find.  In 
Table 3 below, we show what we have been able to assemble from country websites.  However, 
we can only find information for 10 countries, of which only 8 are Sub-Saharan African 
countries.  The countries for which we have found data on staff numbers are, on the whole, the 
higher income and/or higher institutional quality countries 
 
Table 3 
 
Staff Numbers for African Electricity Regulators 
 
Country No Total 
Staff 
No Professional 
Staff 
Electrification 
Rate (%) 
    
Algeria** 39* 31* 98 
Egypt 49 N/A 98 
Ethiopia 60+ N/A 15 
Namibia 15-18 N/A 34 
Niger*** 22 14 N/A 
Senegal 30 N/A 33 
South Africa**** About 115 N/A 70 
Tanzania***** 42 N/A 11 
Uganda 18 13 9 
Zambia 55 N/A 19 
 
* Includes 12 Board Members and Directors 
** Electricity and gas regulatory agency 
*** Multi-sector Regulatory agency 
**** Regulates gas and oil pipelines as well as electricity 
***** Regulatory agency covers water as well as electricity 
 
N/A – Not available 
 
                                                 
18  Domah, Pollitt & Stern, Appendix 2. 
19  A high proportion of professional staff in ANEEL in Brazil are engineers.  This seems to be common in the 
energy regulators of other Latin American countries – and we suspect more widely.  We are grateful to 
Ashley Brown for information in this. 
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Sources: National Regulatory Agency Websites for staff numbers and UNDP Human 
Development Report 2007/08 for electrification rates.  
Latest available data, typically 2005-07.  Dates sometimes unclear. 
 
Of the ten countries, only two (Namibia and Uganda) had electricity regulators with fewer than 
20 staff.  For the remaining eight, with the exception of South Africa, total staff numbers were in 
the 30 - 60 range.   
 
Of the ten countries in this table, only three (Ethiopia, Namibia and Uganda) were in the DPS 
2001-02 sample.  The Namibian electricity regulatory agency is effectively the same size as 
2001-02 but both the Ugandan regulatory agency and the Ethiopian regulatory agency have 
significantly increased in size.  The Ugandan regulatory agency has increased its staff numbers 
from12 to 18 with an increase in the number of professional staff from 5 to 13, while the 
Ethiopian regulatory agency has grown from 26 staff to over 60. 
 
If we assume that 2/3 of total staff are professionals, the table above implies that there are around 
20 – 40 professional staff per regulatory agency.  This represents a sizeable fixed cost for the 
country, especially where the regulatory agency is just for electricity, which is the case for all but 
Niger and Tanzania.  This is most obvious for Ethiopia and Zambia both of which have over 50 
total regulatory staff but have electrification rates of 15% and 19% respectively.  In addition, 
whereas in other parts of the world the regulatory agency would also have responsibility for 
natural gas, that does not seem to be the case for any of the ten countries in our table.  This 
further increases the fixed costs of regulation. 
 
It might be expected that the human resource problems of finding sufficient qualified staff for 
SSA regulatory agencies might lead to their making greater use of outsourcing.  However, 
Tremolet et al. (2004) showed, firstly, that African regulators were less likely to outsource 
regulatory functions than most other regions – and much less than OECD regulators; and, 
secondly, that outsourcing of regulatory tasks was less likely for electricity than for telecom or 
multi-sectoral regulators.  Why this is so, is unclear, although Tremolet et al. shows that the costs 
of external consultants coupled with low regulatory budgets seem to be important impediments.  
There also seem to be concerns about effectively managing and using external consultants. 
 
 
4. Concluding Comments 
 
The discussion above shows that the fixed costs of regulation remains as significant as our 
original DPS paper suggested.  In addition, the human resource requirements for specialist 
professional staff seem still to be a binding constraint for some low income and/or small 
countries.   
 
However, the most significant - and worrying - finding of this paper is how little new information 
on regulatory staff numbers there is since 2002.  It is surprising (and disappointing) that neither 
the ITU nor the IERN or any other multilateral agency collects such data and nor do the regional 
regulatory groupings such as OLADE or AFUR.   
 
What little new data has emerged (e.g. for India and Latin America) tends to confirm the findings 
for 2001-02.  Little seems to have changed:  the Indian State Regulators still have tiny numbers 
 17 
of staff, the Caribbean and some of the smaller, poorer Latin American countries still have very 
low numbers of regulatory staff, while the middle income Latin American regulators seem, at 
least as far as these data inform us, not to have any human resource problems.  For Africa, for the 
countries covered typical electricity staff numbers are in the 30-60 range.  Of the three regulators 
in both the DPS sample for whom we have been able to collect recent data, two have grown by 
over 50% since 2002.  
 
Case studies and World Bank and other reports have consistently shown that good regulatory 
governance and practice can help improve electricity and other utility performance in terms of 
efficiency, costs, prices, access rates etc – and that poor regulatory quality can be a serious 
impediment (see Besant-Jones, 2006, for a survey).  They have also shown that the availability of 
sufficient regulatory staff can be crucial as to whether or not electricity and other regulatory 
agencies can, in practice, achieve their potential.  This applies, in particular, to specialist 
regulatory experts such as accountants, economists and lawyers.  The problems for Sub-Saharan 
African and some other countries in recruiting such staff  has led to much discussion as to how to 
alleviate shortages by other means.  (See Brown et al 2006, Chapter 4.)   
 
However, the comments above assume that staff numbers and, in particular, professional staff 
numbers are genuinely important for the successful delivery of regulatory outputs, controlling for 
all other relevant factors.  We – and the authors of many other pieces on regulatory effectiveness 
– strongly suspect that this is so, but we cannot properly demonstrate it.   
 
Since 2002, our understanding of the impact of stronger as opposed to weaker regulatory 
governance has improved considerably.  Building on earlier literature on telecoms, Cubbin and 
Stern (2006) have shown that regulatory governance (and age of regulatory agency) has 
significant impacts on generation investment.  They did this with the DPS data set, using fixed-
effects econometric models.  That has become the standard technique to estimate the impact of 
regulatory arrangements (and privatization and competition) on electricity industry outcomes.  
More recently, Andres et al (2008) have shown similar impacts on Latin American and Caribbean 
distribution company performance, again with the use of panel data models with fixed-effects, as 
have Estache and Rossi (2008) using a sample of developing country distribution companies 
from around the world. 
 
However, none of these studies was able to estimate the impact of staff (or professional staff 
numbers) on industry performance.  This was the case even though both Cubbin and Stern and 
Andres et al. were using data sets which included data on staff numbers.  The reason why they 
could not do so was that the data on staff numbers was only present in the data set for one single 
year.  In consequence, for panel data modeling, the single year of data became just one part of the 
country/company specific fixed effect.   
 
So, the modeling in this area shows that fixed effects consistently provide the best fitting models 
but, with the current data availability, this means that we cannot seriously estimate whether staff 
and professional staff numbers genuinely matter for regulatory performance.  This is an 
extremely unsatisfactory state of affairs for anyone involved either in policy making or research 
in these areas and suggests that there would be a major improvement in our knowledge if one of 
the multilateral bodies – or some aspiring PhD students – could be persuaded to collect such data 
retrospectively.  At the least, it seems reasonable for ITU, IERN and the regional regulatory 
groupings to collect it on a systematic basis moving forward. 
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When we started our work in this area in 2001, we hoped that we would be able to follow it up 5-
10 years later and find not only new data but also to be able to report information which 
suggested that the recently established electricity/energy regulators had managed to expand their 
professional staff sufficiently to become effective regulatory agencies.  We saw that as being very 
important both in attracting much-needed new investment and improving efficiency but also for 
developing more sophisticated market arrangements – and for meeting new challenges such as 
climate change.  However, we find, firstly, that there is disappointingly little new information; 
and, secondly, that, insofar as we can judge, little seems to have changed in terms of human 
resource availability relative to 2001-02.    
 
We strongly believe that more attention should be paid to this issue and how it can best be 
addressed.  We urgently need panel data and this requires systematically collecting data on 
regulatory staff numbers on a regular (e.g. annual) basis.  We see this as an obvious – and 
important task for AFUR, OLADE and IERN. 
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